Abstract-Earnings management is the one of the classic topics in accounting field. Most of the extant studies focus on accrual-based earnings management. Recent years, real activities earnings management has received more attention from researchers. Exploration of earnings management behavior can extend the current limited earnings management studies, helping to improve the corporate governance, improving the quality of earnings information, promoting the healthy and orderly development of the securities market. With the aim to provide guidance for corporate governance and future research, firstly, this study dealt with the existing research literature of earnings management on the incentives, means and economic consequences, measure methods, then made comparative analysis of accrual-based and real activities earnings management. Finally this article summarized the main research results and limitations of the current earnings management, providing direction to extend our real earnings management research and improve the quality of the earnings quality.
INTRODUCTION
Managers usually use earnings management to achieve their business objectives (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012) . Earnings management is divided into accrued items surplus management and real earnings management activities. Accrued-based earnings management is achieved through the adoption of different accounting methods, while real activities earnings management to be achieved by manipulating the enterprises real activities. No matter what kind of earnings management was used, it will generate effects on the firm performance; what's more, real activities manipulation management will cause more significant influence on firm value. Extant studies of real earnings management mainly focus on earnings management means identification, influencing factors, economic results, managers' choices between accrual-based and real activities manipulation earnings management, and so on. This study reviews the existing research on earnings management comprehensively. The second part reviews related research on earnings management approach and incentives, the third part reviews the related research on economic consequences and influence factors of earnings management, the fourth part reviews relationship between accrued-based and the real activities manipulation management. Finally, this article summarizes the main research results and limitations of the current research.
II. EARNINGS MANAGEMENT INCENTIVES AND MEANS
Theory and evidence indicate that managers' concerns over current performance motivate them to engage in manipulating current period earnings at the expense of future period earnings (e.g., Stein,1989 JGYJ-201543) are more likely to report earnings that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts. Also, managers with high equity incentives are more likely to report earnings that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) show that incentives derived from stock-based compensations motivate managers to engage in AEM.
Extensive research has documented that Chinese listed firms use discretion in the accrual accounting process to manage their earnings information. The CSRC requires firms to report positive earnings (return on equity) for three consecutive years, and Chen and Yuan (2004) There are studies showing that managers will alter the timing or structuring of transactions, investment, and allocation of resources to boost accounting earnings in the current periods, including accelerating the sales, changing the schedule, delaying development costs and other methods (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). It has a direct effect on operating activities and cash flow. At present, the most classic definition of earnings management bout the real activities are proposed by Roychowdhury (2006) : "it is an enterprise's economic activities which managers in order to mislead the users of the information and build the painstakingly, phasing deviation from normal business operations ". Later, some scholars also reached the same conclusion through empirical studies that managers would manipulate the real activities to achieve their goals (Bens et al., 2002200; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kim et al., 2010). Managers will reduce R&D spending to boost the company's short-term performance (Bushee 1998; Cheng, 2004). When income is not achieve at desired goal, managers can increase current earnings by selling fixed assets and securities to increase current earnings (might, D., t. Inoue, and w. Thomas, 2003) . Graham et al. (2005) found that 80% of managers achieve the profit targets of the current period by reducing R&D, advertising, upkeep and postpone the new projects. Research has shown that managers will use R&D spending to buy back shares to avoid diluted earnings per share, to achieve the short-term goal (Bens et al., 2003; Hribar et al., 2006). Managers can manipulate COGS expense in any period by overproducing to spread fixed overhead costs over a larger number of units as long as the reduction in per-unit cost is not offset by inventory holding costs or any increase in marginal cost in the current period. Thomas and Zhang (2002)'s study shows that enterprises engage in excessive production enterprises to achieve business objectives. Roychowdhury (2006) argues that management mainly from sales manipulation (e.g., ease restrictions on the conditions of sale, credit conditions, increase sales, discount, etc.), production control(such as using the scale effect mass production in order to reduce the unit product cost), the control of discretionary expenditure(such as narrowing the research and development costs, advertising costs and maintenance costs, etc.) earnings management three aspects to carry on the real activities manipulation. Later, many scholars research of earnings management on real activities are all around these three ways Gunny (2010) found that companies which just return the earnings benchmark by real earnings management activities has a better operating performance over the next three years than companies which didn't use earnings management and not reach the earnings benchmark, he made the interpretation of the results using signaling theory, thinking the enterprises' real activities earnings management gives a positive signal to the market, offsetting the adverse effect. Real activities manipulation management is potentially more costly for firms in the long run than accruals-based earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010 (2012) show an improvement in corporate governance after the SSSREF has reduced both tunneling and excess leverage by controlling shareholders with excess control rights. Later, Kuo et al. (2014) find that firms' use of discretionary accruals was constrained, and they have consequently shifted to less detectable and under-scrutinized real earnings activities after the split share structure reform.
IV. EARNINGS MANAGEMENT MEASUREMENT MODEL

Accrual-based earnings management
Daniel A. Cohen and Paul Zarowin use a cross-sectional model to calculate discretionary accruals, where for each year we estimate the model for every industry classified by its 2-digit SIC code. Thus, our approach partially controls for industry-wide changes in economic conditions that affect total accruals while allowing the coefficients to vary across time (Kasznik, 1999; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994 ). Their primary model for estimating discretionary accruals is based on the following cross-sectional model estimated for each 2 digit SICyear grouping as follows:
where, for fiscal year t and firm i, TA represents the total accruals defined as TA it = EBXI it -CFO it . where is the earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations and CFO is the operating cash flows taken from the statement of cash flows Asset it-1 represents total assets, ∆SALES it is the change in revenues from the preceding year, and PPE it is the gross value of property, plant and equipment.
The coefficient estimates from (1) are used to estimate the firm-specific normal accruals (NA it ) for our sample firms. Where measurement of discretionary accruals is the difference between total accruals and the fitted normal accruals, defined as DA it = (TA it /Assets i,t-1 )-NA it
Real activities manipulation earnings management
According to Roychowdhury (2006) , real activities manipulation earnings management is achieved mainly by three means. They are sales, production and discretionary expenditure manipulation. These three means could be measured by abnormal operating activities net cash flow, abnormal product cost and abnormal discretionary expenses respectively.
Estimate the normal operating activities cash flow
Among them, the CFO it is Cash flow from operating activities of company i in year t, Asset i,t-1 is the total assets of company i in year t-1, SALES it is the sales of company i in year 
t, SALES it =SALES t -SALES t-1N ,subtracting
the normal operating activities cash flow with the actual operating activities cash flow, to calculate the abnormal operating activities cash flow R_CFO it of company i in year t,and then calculate the average abnormal operating activities cash flow R_CFO i of company i during sample as average sales manipulation level of company i.
Estimate the normal production cost
Among them, PROD i is the sum of variation of production cost, operation cost and inventory cost of company i in year t, in the same way, we calculate RM_PROD it and RM_PROD i as average production manipulation level of company i. Among them, DISEXP it is the discretionary expenses of company i in year t, the sum of the sales cost and management cost. In the same way, calculate RM_DISEXP it and RM_DISEXP i as average discretionary expenses level.
Estimate the normal discretionary expenses
Considering that company may use three earnings management at the same time, therefore, refer to the method of Li Zengfu, establishing comprehensive indicators RM t .
V. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCRUED-BASED AND THE REAL ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION MANAGEMENT Schipper(1989) put forward the viewpoint of real activities manipulation, thinking that real activities manipulation, like accrued items earnings management, are all managers for their personal interests and behavior intervention in the financial report. Previous studies mostly tend to be accrued items earnings management, but with the increase of regulation, especially the sarbanes-oxley issued after the manipulation of real activities manipulation became managers surplus better choice (Tan, Jamal, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008 Zang (2012) report that firms whose auditors are likely to be more vigilant with respect to accounting choices engage more in real activities manipulation management. Further, existing literature suggests that the presence of institutional investors constrains real activities earnings management (Zang 2012 ). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) investigates the behaviors of REM and AEM around seasoned equity offerings (SEO), that is, during the period in which managers have relatively high incentives to artificially inflate current period earnings. They find that earnings manipulation via both accruals and real activities is associated with poor future earnings performance, although the association is stronger when real activities are involved. Zang (2012) investigates the sequentiality and substitutive relation between AEM and REM. She finds that managers make REM decisions during the fiscal year before making AEM decisions around the end of the accounting period. Her analysis further shows that while managers use both AEM and REM to manage reported earnings; these two methods are substitutes for each other. Matsuura(2008) also finds that these two earnings management methods are sequential but complementary in income smoothing. The preceding results, taken as a whole, suggest that managers take into account potential costs associated with their choice between AEM and REM when deciding upon earnings management strategies.
VI. CONCLUSION
Studies about earnings management is in a stage of vigorous development. Research on the motivation of earnings management is relatively rich, for example, meeting earnings benchmarks, obtaining stock-based compensation and desirable stock valuations, pressure related to job security, and so on. Earnings management is achieved by two means, accruals-based management and real earnings management activities. The former is manipulated by accounting method, and the latter is manipulation real activities, mainly including sales, production cost and discretionary expenses.
Most research demonstrates that earnings management led to negative economic consequences. Studies also find that real activities manipulation management imposes more serious consequences on firms than accrual-based earnings management. Existing research on the analysis of the economic consequences of earnings management is not very comprehensive, some studies even generate contradictory results, so further research is necessary to dig deeper to find out the reasons. Most research results are based on data in US. Future research could investigate further the effect of institutional characteristic on the behavior of earnings management.
